After much prodding and many sleepless nights I wrote this story several years ago for Tim Duffie's CAC/CAP website. As I have not been able to contact Tim, and with the recent events which impacts this story, I have decided to update and bring it to the Terre Haute, Marine Corps League's website. The original story will remain at http://www.capmarine.com/cap/echo4.htm for as long as that website remains intact. Through the years I had noticed several things that needed to be changed, due to later recollections on my part and contacts from others whom were there. It also didn't get changed because I had such a long and difficult time writing the original story. I guess I sort of had an agreement with it, if it would leave me alone, I would leave it alone. Then with finding out that Dennis Hammond was coming home, I found it to be much easier to deal with. Also, after having struggled with "Survivor's Guilt" for many years I remembered what a fellow Veteran had recently told me. "Some are chosen to die for their Country, others are chosen to tell the story."
With that being said, here is the story of the events leading up to and including the Siege of Echo 4(The Battle at Lo Giang), the loss of the reaction force, and the capture of Dennis Hammond, Joseph Zawtocki, and Don Talbot. As with the original story I'll rewrite this primarily from memory, and with the help of the letters that I had sent to my family. You will see that some of the dates will be changed a little. This was done considering some information I received after I wrote the original story. Some of the other changes are due to contacts that I have made who were there at the same time.
Although I do not remember the exact number of Echo units, or the exact unit designation by location, I do know Echo 2 and Echo 4 is correct. Echo 2 is where I served with Dennis up until right before TET, 1968, when I was called back to HoaVang, our Echo CAP headquarters as a radioman and truck driver. Not realizing it then, this move was to eventually save my life, but left me with many haunting memories.
I believe there were 6 Echo units. They were strung out approximately 2-4 miles outside the perimeter of Danang Airbase. Echo-2 and Echo-4 to the south; Echo-1 to the west (close to Marble Mountain); Echo-3 to the east, and Echo-4 & 5 to the north. Of course, to CAP'ers, being this close to Danang was considered gravy duty, which for the most part it was until Tet of 1968
One would think that being this close to Da Nang, you should have the best air and fire support in country. This was not to be the case, as we shall see. For some silly reason, the only way we could get support from Da Nang was by going through MP battalion at Danang, no direct contacts allowed.
On the morning of February 7th, 1968, we monitored radio traffic between a "bird-dog"(spotter plane as used by Forward Air Controllers sometimes called "FACs") and Da Nang/MP battalion. This is the context of the radio log as I remember it. Being that I do not remember the call signs, I shall use "Da Nang" and "Bird-Dog"
Bird-dog : "Da Nang, I've got approximately 400-600 unknowns on the ground, at approximately (gave coordinates) 15 miles south of your position!"
Da Nang : "We have some units working in that area, but nothing close to that size. Can you identify?"
Bird-dog: "Negative, Da Nang...they have moved under canopy..."
Da Nang: "Advise, stay on station for as long as possible and we will work it on this end"
(End of this log....no other transmissions were ever heard.)
Author's Notes
What no one knew at this time was that the NVA(North Vietnamese Army)and some locals(Viet Cong)had massed for an attack on Da Nang on the 6th, hopefully under the cover of darkness, but due to delays did not get into position until after daylight on the 7th. At this point we believe their strategy was to wait until darkness of the evening of the 6th. However, after being spotted by the Bird-dog, their plans changed rapidly.
Under concealment of the dense foliage, they made their way as close as they could to the perimeter of ECHO-4, realizing that we probably would not fire on our own unit as long as they did not try and "over-run" it. Once again they hoped they could hold this position until nightfall. At this point, ECHO-4 came under intense fire, and with 11 Marines and a handful of PF's held off the hordes for several hours.
No Marines or PF's at Echo-4 were lost, although a few received serious wounds.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Now this part, for some reason I cannot pinpoint exactly when it happened. Perhaps later events have taken their toll on my memory. I only know that it happened prior to the loss of the reaction force, because Sgt. Ramos was on that reaction force.
At some point of time on the 6th or 7th but prior to the loss of the reaction force, Sgt Ramos and I drove from HoaVang to Echo-2. We had just arrived when 200-300 NVA made the river crossing towards Da Nang (see map above) . I remember trying to get MP battalion at Danang to react to the situation, but could not get them to understand our location. They seemed to not be able to comprehend the fact that the enemy was that close, and were more interested in my radio procedure than the help that I was trying to obtain. For whatever reason, no help was obtained from MP battalion.
To this day, I have no idea why or how, but two small WWII type aircraft ( I now have reason to believe they were Sky Raiders) piloted by someone(perhaps Vietnamese Pilots), arrived and made immediate hits on the NVA crossing the river (see map above). Our only opinion is that our Vietnamese troops at HoaVang were monitoring our radio, heard how far MP battalion had their head up their butts, and made a call for their own air support. But for what ever the reason, it probably saved Echo 2 and 3 as the surviving NVA could do nothing but disperse as rapidly as possible once across the river (see map above)
For the record, I believe I read, perhaps in an after action report years after the event where that "288" NVA were claimed to have been killed. Certainly the 288 is a very inflated number. Perhaps 100-150, but certainly not 288. The sad part is, many of these were South Vietnamese that the NVA had forced across the river as cover. Unfortunately, 500 pound bombs and 20mm shells couldn't tell the difference.
My last comment on this event is as follows. It is not intended to degrade the ARVN's, but to place credit where credit is due. ( see map above)
Approximately a month prior to the river crossing, the ARVN's had set up an 8-10 man position as shown on the map above. Everyday they would practice fire their .50 Cal. machine gun. When the fatal day came, we watched them all run from the battle except for one lonely Chu-Hoi ( a Chu-Hoi is a previous enemy solder that defected and chose to fight for the South) who we found later lying beside the empty .50 Cal. which he had destroyed, probably as his last action.
In my original story I struggled with my memory with the events that took place inside Echo 4 at the time they were under seige.At the time of the incident Sgt. Keith Cossey was the compound commander of Echo 4. In 2002 I had the pleasure of a visit with Keith and his family at my home. After many hours of reflecting on the incident I asked Keith if he would write in his own words and to the best of his memory what took place at Echo 4, I had heard enough on the radio that I knew it would be a very interesting story. I think some of you will find that to be true also.
Here is the untouched e-mail I received from Keith shortly after his visit:
. Hi, Mike---
Sorry I missed your phone call this morning.
One note about the helicopter extraction which seems to have been overlooked in various accounts. Those of us rescued from inside Echo 4 came out on Air Force helicopters, and the extraction was not executed via the chain of command.
At what I recall as being approximately 1700 hours on February 8, I said over the radio to whom it would concern: "If you want any survivors left from this unit, this would be the time to extract us if possible. Most of us have either had our M-16's finally jam or are out of ammo; we are using ammo and AK-47's off the bodies of dead NVA as available. The village that we are ostensibly defending has been evacuated by the civilians and is in part blown away by friendly and enemy elements. The wire surrounding our compound has been blown and inftrated by the enemy---a number of whom are dead in a pile nearby where we have dragged them. Our ammo bunker is burning. Most of us are wounded. And there are a whole lot more enemy out there. We understand that there are now U.S. troops between our location and the Da Nang airbase, thus no longer necessitating our squad of Marines and platoon of PF's to be the 'finger in the dike' holding back the flood of NVA from the airbase." Or words to that effect. I did not use the word "Mayday," but that was the essence of my communication.
We had been fighting a greatly numerically superior force for over fourteen hours, and some of us had been wounded since the initial onslaught at 0240 in the morning.
In short order, I received back radio messages from both the Marine and Army helicopter elements in the area. They'd have really liked to be able to help us, but the entire compound area represented a "much too hot LZ" to attempt an extraction by helicopter.
However, I received an unauthorized query from some Air Force helicopter pilots in the vicinity.
"Do you have any AK-47 rifles down there in Echo 4? We can get good money for those in the black market---you know, souvenirs and all that. We have two birds in the air and would come down---one at a time---to pick up you and the rifles if you have any to give us... I repeat: Do you have AK-47's for us down there?"
"We have a shitload of AK-47 rifles down here," I accurately answered (and I believe that those were my exact words).
"Okay then, " responded the voice from the sky. "do this: Gather up all the AK-47's you can into one pile where they can easily be loaded onto a chopper. Call for a withering barrage of artillery and/or gun ship fire onto the entire tree line and area surrounding the Echo 4 compound. Then give us the word..."
The black marketeers were true to their word. One helicopter landed. First, it was loaded with the AK-47's. Then we put the PF's---some of whom were hysterical with fear---onto that first helicopter.
A part of the story that I regret in retrospect---and took my share of flak for---took place when the crew chief said to me that they had room in that first chopper for one more man before lifting off. I looked back at the remaining Marines and Navy corpsman, and they implored me to go because I was the worst wounded. I had to make a split-second decision. The PF commander was incapable of commanding his own troops because, since the enemy had located his family and cut off their heads a week previous, he had been crying inconsolably and had been an ineffective combatant (the South Vietnamese good-old-boy system subsequently awarded this individual with a medal for bravery in this action. My assistant compound commander, Corporal Clyde Sawyer, had been doing an excellent job throughout the fighting and was not swimming through the effects of morphine and darvon---administered by the corpsman---as I was. Besides, my rifle had taken a direct hit in my hands and was a twisted piece of junk (though I carried it all the way to the hospital).
I ordered Corporal Sawyer to take charge of the squad remaining on the ground---believing the second helicopter to be "just around the corner"---and boarded the first outgoing helicopter with the PF's.
The fact is that the second helicopter (which may have merely been the first helicopter after it dumped off its load of survivors at the hospital and its load of AK-47's God-knows-where) took a long time in picking up the men remaining on the ground at Echo 4. One of the PF's whom I was able to locate and speak to, during my 1992 return visit to Lo Giang, mentioned also how long it seemed before the second helicopter came into the Da Nang military hospital with Corporal Sawyer, the Marines, and Navy corpsman.
Nobody who had to wait for the second chopper was killed (I do not know if any more were wounded), but waiting in the hospital for my men to arrive on that second helicopter was the longest, most painful wait in my life. And a Major Burke was intent (unsuccessfully) on court-martialling me, once I got back from a month of surgery and recuperation at the Tachikawa Air Force Base hospital in Japan---for having arranged any extraction for any of us from Echo 4 in any number of helicopters; he thought that we should have stayed and joined in death the large numbers of NVA whom we had already dispatched.
The fact that not one of our CAP platoon members inside Echo 4 was killed---though most of us were wounded (and one, PFC Grant, was and still is a full-disability psychiatric casualty)---occasioned the painful and outrageous term, "collaboration with the enemy," to be leveled at me by Major Burke who was distraught (as we were) at the fate of dear friends and fellow Marines and PF's wiped out in the reaction force.
I was twenty-two years old, a Marine Corps Reservist on voluntary active duty (I had,naively perhaps, wanted to go to Viet Nam ), and had just been promoted to sergeant and compound commander. I am proud of my service in the Combined Action Program, appreciate and honor the efforts of the Army troops (some of whom were in the hospital with me) to throw back the NVA from their thrust toward Da Nang . And I am especially saddened by the fact, learned later from Corporal Greeno and Lance Corporal Talbot who both survived from the reaction force (Greeno left for dead... and Talbot wounded and taken prisoner before later escaping in the confusion of battle), that the PF's in the reaction force who were taken alive by the enemy were tortured to death for being "traitors" to their homeland.
I shall pause for now and further catch my breath (which I have been catching for the past thirty-plus years). I would be glad to resume this conversation in any way which might prove helpful.
Good to hear from you again, Mike.
Semper Fidelis. God bless. Take care, bro'...
---Keith
(Burton K. Cossey, USMC 2067439)
Due to the critical nature of ECHO-4's plight, a call went out to Echos 1, 2, and 3 for volunteers to form a reaction force to re-supply and reinforce ECHO-4's position. At this time no one had a very good idea of the size of the enemy force. A truck was dispatched to bring the volunteers to HoaVang.
When the truck pulled up in front of our radio hooch, the first person that I noticed was Dennis Hammond, my best and closest friend. We had served almost 10 months together at Echo-2, both loving to hunt and fish....we were naturals. Dennis was on his second and last tour, having saved his money for a Corvette and some land in Canada. He and his brother were going to start a hunting and fishing camp there. At the time, Dennis had less than three weeks left in his tour, and an immediate discharge upon arriving home. Here is the conversation that took place:
Me: "Ham-bone, what in the #$%#$ are you doing! Your too %^$*&ing short for this kind of shit!"
Dennis: "Hey Tiny, I been here for two$%#@#ing years, and can't see where I've accomplished shit. This will be my last chance!" (and sadly enough, it was)
The truck pulled away as I acknowledged several other members of Echos 1, 2, and 3. I was denied going by my C.O., as I was to be the primary source of radio contact.
The truck proceeded to just south of Cam Le bridge ( see map above), to where the reaction force started their assault. They proceeded east across the open terrain for approximately 500 yards. Then they came to a deep irrigation ditch which they used for cover until they were within a few yards of the dense foliage that surrounded ECHO 4. At this point the seventeen man reaction force walked head long into an estimated 200-300 man ambush.
Here is the radio log as I remember it. It's pretty accurate. It should be. I get to hear it quite often. Only the part where first contact was made, is included. I also have recently remembered the call signs that were used.
I'd like to note the calmness of Capt. Joselane's voice, during the entire radio exchanges. He was a fine Marine Officer.
Capt. Joselane = Nettlerash Actual.
Myself / HoaVang= Nettlerash
Nettlerash Actual: "Nettlerash,we've just started taking heavy fire. I'll give you some numbers (coordinates)in a minute."
(30-40 seconds later)
Nettlerash Actual: "....we're getting chewed up....see if Echo 4 can send some people to help."
(Few seconds later)
Nettlerash Actual: "....we're not going to get out...there are too many...they're all over us....no way out. Don't send anyone else in here................tell my wife I love her........."
(with that, all radio communication with the reaction force ended)
From beginning to end, this action could not have lasted more than 3 minutes.
Evening of February 8th:
Due to failing light, an exact location of the reaction force, shortage of manpower, 2nd CAG made the call that we would wait for the morning of the 9th. This was not a very popular choice with the remaining folks at HoaVang, and it almost prompted a mutiny. A tank company, I don't remember which, was contacted for support, since we knew we couldn't get anything out of MP battalion. We had perhaps 10-12 men assembled at HoaVang when the tank's C.O. informed us the equipment he had available was either too wide or too heavy (I can't remember which)to cross the Cam Le bridge.(see map above) At that point it was aborted, and we were forced to wait until the morning of the 9th.
It seems as if this night lasted for weeks, the enemy which we now know remained in the area for much of the night could be heard chattering on our radio frequency. For one Marine lying wounded, I'm sure it lasted for eternity.
I don't remember his first name as he was a newbie at either Echo-1 or Echo-3, but "Greeno" may have been the luckiest man in the world on that night. In trying to keep a chronological order to the events, I will tell his story and let him tell his in a moment.
Morning of the 9th:
At first light another reaction force was assembled at HoaVang. We proceeded south of the Cam Le bridge and departed the truck near the junction of Highway 1 and "old dirt road"(see map above). From there we walked towards the area where we believed the reaction force would be found. The following description of what we found I only include for the sake of the heroism and courage that had left a vivid picture.
As we walked east across the open terrain, we came upon a very deep irrigation ditch which we immediately used for cover, not realizing at that time that the reaction force had used the same ditch. As we moved farther east, we began seeing pieces of shrapnel and other signs of an intense battle. Our Australian point (which was one of two Australian Army Advisers we had at HoaVang) then came upon the first casualty. I will not go into any great detail here, as I will only comment on certain things for historical purposes.
Greeno was where he had layed all night with at least seven wounds. He had applied his own tourniquets. Here is the story he told me several days later in a hospital in Japan.
Greeno: "They let us get right to the tree line before they hit us. We thought because of the ditch we had excellent cover, but that wasn't true. There were so many of them, they had good coverage of that part of the ditch and just kept blooping rocket grenades."
"They captured Hammond, Zawtocki, and Talbot. We saw them being led away."
"We tried to attack into the ambush, but it was too late. They had too good a position just inside the tree line. And there were too many."
"Gifford was a hero. Every time I saw him he was moving to a new position to treat someone else. He moved as if the the heavy fire was the least of his concerns."
Author's Note: When we found Greg "bac-si" Gifford, we observed the following:
He had used almost all of his medical pack. We found several Marines that he had treated. Although showing multiple wounds, he had not treated himself. He was found at the side of Pete Cruz with his last roll of gauze still clutched in his hand. An empty clip for his .45 was found beneath him. It appeared the rest he had tried to bury beside him, probably not noticeable by the NVA in the darkness that soon followed.
Greg performed far beyond the highest tradition of the Marine Corpsman. His dignified manners while at Echo-2 were way beyond his young years. If anyone ever deserved the Congressional Medal of Honor, he did. He and his family were cheated.
Continuing with Greeno:
Greeno: "I was eventually knocked out. When I came to, it was dark and the NVA were walking all over the area. Anytime I heard them coming close to me, I played dead. They searched and kicked me several times that night. At one point, early in the morning but before light, I thought they had left. I raised my head to look. There was a lone NVA radioman not more than ten feet away, looking directly at me. He motioned with his hand for me to lay back down .I'll never forget that. Soon after that, he and the others left the area."
(Author's note) A few years ago, Vini Larsen who had wore Dennis Hammond's POW bracelet contacted me after having read the original Echo-4 story. He became deeply involved in researching the entire incident. Several months later he stumbled across an article that would chillingly tell why the NVA Radioman had let Greeno live. You can read that article by clicking on: The NVA Radioman - Why He Let Greeno Live.
That afternoon, while trying to get a truck down the "old dirt road" (see map above) and into the area to evacuate the KIA, I found a land mine with a deuce-and a half. ( 2 1/2 Ton Truck) and spent some time at a hospital in Japan. I then somehow managed to talk my way into going back for my last 30 days, I was missing my friends at the Echos. I guess I really didn't think about it at the time but most of my friends were already gone, either KIA, POW, or wounded and sent home or out of country. I spent those 30 days at HoaVang, with almost daily visits to the Echos. But it was never to be the same. Almost all of the Echo CAP members were now "newbies", but had already heard the story of the courageous Marines they were there to replace. The only happy reminders were our local South Vietnamese villagers, who never forgot our friendship or sacrifices.
Author's note:
For many years many of the men including myself had believed that the "Siege of Echo 4" was a remote and isolated incident in the area of Lo Giang during the 1968 Tet Offensive. But thanks to the information and contacts now available on the Internet some very surprising information has been revealed. Both Marine and Army units knew it as "Task Force Miracle", other major Marine units remembers it as "The Battle at Lo Giang", and of course those of us that were in the Combined Action Program thinks of it as "The Siege of Echo-4" or The Day we lost the Reaction Force".
Here are some of the things we have now learned.
The North Vietnamese's objective was to over-run and/or destroy the Danang Airbase.
In the general area of Lo Giang (just south of the Danang Airbase and the TAOR of Echo 4 and several other Echo CAPs) a major and almost continuous battle took place between the approximate dates of January 30, 1968 and February 9, 1968.
Several elements of both the Marines and the Army were absolutely vital in defending the Danang Airbase. Once a few of the enemy got north of the Cao Do River and in sight of the Airbase, they made the unlucky mistake of entering Echo 3's turf. Once there they had to deal with a handful of CAP Marines that made their life miserable for several hours. And of course what else could be written about CAP Echo 4's "Alamo" style defensive stand.
The one thing that I have never been able to understand, is why so many, fought so few, for so long at the Echo 4 compound. Unless the enemy believed that Echo 4's perimeter was the first major line of defense of the Danang Airbase. Which in some ways I guess it was.....
According to research and some first hand knowledge here are some of the units that fought at the
"Battle of Lo Giang"
Marine - 2nd Combined Action Group, Combined Action Company (CACO) Echo, all Echo CAPs especially Echo 3 and Echo 4. (the "Reaction Force" was made up of volunteers from the balance of the Echo units, of course excluding Echo-4)
Marine- 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines and 2d Battalion, 3rd Marines
Army- the 1st Battalion, 6th Infantry, 196th Light Infantry Brigade
Army- First Battalion, Sixth Infantry, 198th Infantry Brigade
I think if history ever compares, causalities on both sides, outcome, and importance of the Battle at Lo Giang with other major battles fought in Vietnam, "The Battle at Lo Giang" will find it's place among KheSahn, IaDrang, Hamburger Hill and The Battle for Hue. And I'm almost positive if you let the thousands that was inside the Danang Airbase perimeter at the time vote........ok, I won't write history, I'll let it take care of itself.
Here is the list of the Combined Action Program's, Reaction Force, Marines and Navy Corpsman that gave their lives going to the aid of Echo 4 on February 8, 1968 .
Last Name: Basso
First Name: Michele
ID. NO: 2104289
Service: USMC
Rank: Sgt.
Grade: E5
MOS: 0311
Age: 21
Home: North White Plains
State: N. Y.
Casualty Date: 1968-02-08
Birth date: 1946-10-15
Religion: Roman Catholic
Marital Status: Single
Panel: 38E
Line: 020
Last Name: Cruz
First Name: Peter Frank
IDNO: 2328004
Service: USMC
Rank: Cpl.
Grade: E4
MOS: 0353
Age: 21
Home: Chualar
State: CA
Casualty Date: 1968-02-08
Birth date: 1946-09-21
Marital Status: Single
Panel: 38E
Line: 024
Last Name: Jackson
First Name: Johnnie Bruce
IDNO: 2307345
Service: USMC
Rank: LCpl
Grade: E3
MOS: 3531
Age: 20
Home: Fort Worth
State: TX
Casualty Date: 1968-02-08
Birth date: 1947-08-14
Marital Status: Married
Panel: 38E
Line: 030
Last Name: Joselane
First Name: Howard Leo
IDNO: 080626
Service: USMC
Rank: Cpt.
Grade: O-3
MOS: 0302
Age: 29
Home: Chicago
State: IL
Casualty Date: 1968-02-08
Birth date: 1938-02-18
Marital Status: Married
Panel: 38E
Line: 031
Last Name: Kinney
First Name: Lee Charles
IDNO: 2259949
Service: USMC
Rank: Cpl.
Grade: E4
MOS: 3041
Age: 21
Home: Welch
State: MN
Casualty Date: 1968-02-08
Birth date: 1947-01-09
Marital Status: Single Panel: 38E
Line: 031
Last Name: Lamorte
First Name: Arthur William
IDNO: 2332430
Service: USMC
Rank: LCpl.
Grade: E3
MOS: 3516
Age: 19
Home: Baltimore
State: MD
Casualty Date: 1968-02-08
Birth date: 1948-04-06
Marital Status: Single
Panel: 38E
Line: 031
Last Name: Metcalf
First Name: Jimmy Allen
IDNO: 2329760
Service: USMC
Rank: LCpl.
Grade: E3
MOS: 0811
Age: 21
Home: Dallas
State: TX
Casualty Date: 1968-02-08
Birth date: 1946-03-28
Marital Status: Single
Panel: 38E
Line: 033
Last Name: Murphy
First Name: John Robert
IDNO: 2320111
Service: USMC
Rank: LCpl.
Grade: E3
MOS: 1341
Age: 19
Home: Yorktown Heights
State: NY
Casualty Date: 1968-02-08
Birth date: 1948-11-08
Marital Status: Single
Panel: 38E
Line: 034
Last Name: Ramos
First Name: Frank Jr.
IDNO: 1302158
Service: USMC
Rank: SSgt.
Grade: E6
MOS: 0369
Age: 33
Home: Youngstown
State: OH
Casualty Date: 1968-02-08
Birth date: 1934-08-25
Marital Status: Single
Panel: 38E
Line: 037
Last Name: Sirianni
First Name: Daniel Edward
IDNO: 2289227
Service: USMC
Rank: LCpl
Grade: E3
MOS: 2143
Age: 20
Home: Buffalo
State: NY
Casualty Date: 1968-02-08
Birth date: 1948-01-08
Marital Status: Single
Panel: 38E
Line: 039
Last Name: Hammond
First Nave: Dennis Wayne
IDNO: 375506720
Service: USMC
Rank: Sgt
Grade: E5
MOS: 3111
Age: 23
Home: Detroit
State: MI
Casualty Date: 1970-03-07
Birth date: 1946-04-26
Marital Status: Single
Panel: 38E
Line: 029
*Died in POW camp, remains returned in 2004
Last Name: Zawtocki
First Name: Joseph Stanley, Jr.
IDNO: 115362341
Service: USMC
Rank: Sgt
Grade: E5
MOS: 2511
Age: 39
Home: Utica
State: NY
Casualty Date: 1969-12-24
Birth date: 1946-05-16
Marital Status: Single
Panel: 38E
Line: 042
*Died in POW camp, remains returned
CAP Corpsman:
Last Name: Gifford
First Name: Gregory Allen
IDNO: 6963920
Service: USN
Rank: HM3
Grade: E4
MOS: HM3
Age: 19
Home: Billings
State: MT
Casualty Date: 1968-02-08
Birth date: 1948-03-11
Marital Status: Single
Panel: 38E
Line: 028
CAP Corpsman:
Last Name: Johnson
First Name: Charles Eugene
IDNO: 5960991
Service: USN
Rank: HN
Grade: E3
MOS: HN
Age: 23
Home: Toledo
State: OR
Casualty Date: 1968-02-08
Birth date: 1944-10-21
Marital Status: Single
Panel: 38E
Line: 030
A Shadow on the Wall
It was 2:00 a.m in the morning, when he came upon the wall...
a dark black "V" of granite, it stands not very tall.
The timing was premeditated, he had to be alone...
for it's very hard to hear, a voice that's etched in stone.
He paced those wings of black, looking for a friend...
and to reflect upon a moment in time, to a place where they'd once been.
Then the panel suddenly appeared, and the voice was once again heard...
a long lost friend had been found, among the whisper of his word.
In the silence of the night, it echoed from the wall...
"You can let it go now, and thanks for coming to call"
And then he moved away, the silhouetted wall began to fade...
but looking back he noticed......his shadow....it had stayed.
Carl "Mike" "Tiny Readinger
2nd CAG,Combined Action Program
Foxtrot-7,Echo-2 and Echo CACO HoaVang 1967-1968